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From Just War To Just Peace: Re-Visioning Just War Theory From A
Feminist Perspective
Naomi Malone
ABSTRACT
This paper studies the history of just war theory and critiques it from
various feminist perspectives. Using a definition of war as inseparable from the
system within which it is embedded, the paper contends that just war theory has
been incorporated into the realist paradigm that predominates current political
thought, making it susceptible to manipulation. Most importantly, this usurpation
has shifted just war theory’s focus from jus ad bellum to jus in bello
considerations, seriously weakening its deterrent effects on war. The paper
proposes its replacement with a just peace theory, discussing several existing
frameworks and explaining the important part women are playing to achieve its
principles. It concludes that although just war principles might still be helpful as a
framework for limiting the worst excesses of war, current applications do not
adequately meet the presumption against war and for peaceful settlement of
disputes that the theory’s originators envisioned. Just peace theory is an active
theory that promotes practices leading to the reduction of violence in all arenas
and at all levels, from fights in the schoolyard to ethnic conflicts and beyond,
offering concrete examples that can strengthen the last resort criteria of just war
theory.
iii

Introduction
But the real and lasting victories are those of peace, and not of war.
-Ralph Waldo Emerson, Worship

Traditional just war doctrine is enjoying a revival of interest in the wake of
transforming global interrelationships and drastic improvements in military
technology. In spite of optimism in some quarters that globalization and the
expansion of liberal democracy is the answer for world peace, events such as the
genocide in Rwanda, the attacks on the World Trade Center, as well as
longstanding conflicts such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the simmering
Indian-Pakistani standoff over Kashmir indicate that there are deeper issues at
work when it comes to war and peace. The increasing disparity between rich
and poor nations; ethnic, cultural and religious tensions; and nuclear proliferation
are just some of the many issues that ensure that war and violence will continue
to play a predominant role in international relations within the near future.
What is the definition of war? The Blackwell Dictionary of Political Science
defines war as “armed conflict between organized groups with objectives they
deem to be irreconcilable.” This paper uses Joshua Goldstein’s definition of war
as “lethal intergroup violence” and the war system within which wars exist as:
“the interrelated way that societies organize themselves to participate in potential
and actual wars. In this perspective, war is less a series of events than a system
with continuity through time. This system includes, for example, military spending
1

and attitudes about war, in addition to standing military forces and actual
fighting.”1
There are three main strands of western philosophical thought about war:
pacifism, realism and just war theory. Not all pacifists necessarily disagree with
the use of just war theory as a basis for evaluating the necessity for war, but they
believe that the only conclusion that can be made from this analysis is that the
war cannot be justified and that all conflicts can be resolved through arbitration
rather than violence. Realists, on the other hand, are profoundly skeptical of
using moral precepts in any foreign policy issues, war included. Its proponents
argue that power and national security are the only motivating factors in
interstate relations and thus prompt any decisions regarding war. In contrast to
both of these viewpoints, just war theory attempts to restrict wars between states
by subjecting those in authority to certain precepts concerning their
commencement, conduct and termination.
The value of just war theory lies in its ability not to describe the world as it
is, but to provide a framework for debating the justice of particular wars. Thus,
theorists and leaders have shaped and supplemented its principles to adapt to
the requirements of their particular societies and times. The first chapter
concentrates on the historical literature of just war theory, showing that just war
theory is written exclusively by and for men.

1

Goldstein, Joshua. How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. 2001. War and Gender. Joshua Goldstein. 16 March 2003
<http://www.warandgender.com/wgch1.htm>
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Its secular beginnings in ancient Rome and Greece influenced the early
Christian apologist Saint Augustine to reconcile Christian pacifism with Rome’s
need to defend its borders against encroaching invaders. Later, as the Roman
Empire splintered into factions that progressively coalesced into states, theorists
supplemented or reinterpreted its doctrines to justify wars between themselves.
Gradually, the theory returned to its secular roots as the Enlightenment eroded
the invincibility of the Church, eventually becoming embedded in international
laws of war originally designed by the Dutch jurist Grotius and Christian
scholastics such as Francisco Suarez and Francisco Vitoria. Finally, a European
system of states based upon the principles of state sovereignty and international
law arose from the ashes of the Thirty Years War and culminated in the “Peace
of Westphalia.”. During the 19th and early 20th centuries, this combination of the
codification of war with the ascendancy of state sovereignty led to a significant
shift of the doctrine’s emphasis from the original jus ad bellum (just cause)
questions to those of jus in bello (just methods during war), allowing the theory to
flourish even as Western nations use self-interested reasons to justify their
positions. This overlying theme continues to emphasize “balance –of–power” as
the world shaping principle, subjugating just war theory to the role of apologist.
As Nicholas Rengger indicates “many of the arguments surrounding deterrence
policy during the Cold War, military interventions (or lack of them) from the
1960’s to the 1990’s and the “war against terrorism” now are couched in the
language that would be broadly familiar to those theologians, philosophers and

3

jurists who largely created the just war tradition, even if the context of the
debates has changed beyond recognition.”2
Modern secular literature purporting to represent non-realist views
includes Michael Walzer’s works, among them his influential Just and Unjust
Wars and Brian Orend’s book which stresses not only the two dimensions usually
described as just war theory ( jus ad bellum and jus in bello ) but the equally
important principle of jus post bellum (just end to war.) These works accentuate
a legalistic paradigm based on universal human rights. In contrast, there is still a
strong religious strand of just war thought that continues to emphasize the
original casuistical tradition, especially found in the American Catholic Bishops’
The Challenge of Peace.
The references cited in Brian Orend’s recent book War and International
Justice: A Kantian Perspective include only two books that include feminist
viewpoints on the topic, both edited by Jean Bethke Elshtain. This paucity
reflects both the current “maleness” of the topic and the lack of feminist writers
who either have addressed the issue or have been allowed to publish their
thoughts in mainstream journals. According to Goldstein, this exclusion mirrors
the inherent inhospitability of the fields of political science and international
relations to issues about women and gender. He contends that feminist works
written about war and peace are written primarily by women and that these
feminist contributions are seldom found in mainstream journals.

2

Rengger, Nicholas. “On The Just War Tradition In The Twenty-First Century.” International
Affairs 78.2 (2002): 353.
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Within this feminist literature, Jean Bethke Elshtain’s works on just war
theory continue to create a postmodern as well as religious space within the
larger just war debate. Sara Ruddick and Carol Cohn are some other feminists
who specifically address just war theory.
There is also a body of feminist work on war and peace that sheds light on
many other feminist perspectives on war and violence: “From Lourdes Baneria's
and Rebecca Blank's (1989) feminist empiricist discussion of "Women and the
Economics of Military Spending" to Elshtain's (1987) postmodernist explorations
of gendered war narratives; from Judith Stiehm's (1989) empirical research on
women in the U.S. military to the epistemologically varied essays that form
Adrienne Harris' and Ynestra King's (1989) volume on how feminists think about
peace and the parallel volume edited by Sharon MacDonald, Pat Holden, and
Shirley Ardener (1988) on images of women in war and peace, we find a stream
of efforts to consider who owns, is constituted by, accepts, challenges, and
rejects IR's wars and peaces.”3 According to Jacqui True, these represent “very
contradictory and overlapping positions, discourses and practices.”4
Nonetheless, this diversity does not preclude the possibility of a feminist debate
on just war theory. Feminist ethics derives much of its vitality from such diversity.
The chapter analyzes just war from these broad perspectives found in “the
three epistemologies commonly referred to in the feminist IR literature as feminist
3

Christine Sylvester, “Feminist Theory and Gender Studies in International Relations”,
International Studies Notes, 16/17, (Fall 1991/Winter 1992) 3/1:32-38 Feminist Theory and
Gender Studies. International Studies Association. 23 June, 2002.
<http://csf.colorado.edu/isa/ftgs/femir.html >
4

True, Jacqui, “Feminism”, Theories of International Relations, eds. S. Burchill and A. Linklater,
New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995, 1996, 212.
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empiricism, feminist standpoint and feminist postmodernism.”5 Feminist
empiricists argue that the male-centric framework within which research is done
in political science and international relations makes value-free and objective
knowledge impossible. Judith Stiehm’s empirical research on women in the U.S.
Military, Arms and the Enlisted Woman is representative of this viewpoint.
Feminist standpoint theorists believe that people's perceptions of society differ
because they have different outlooks. Borrowing from Marxism, feminist
standpoint theorists contend that women have access to knowledge unavailable
to mainstream society because of their marginalization. They attempt to take
account of the standpoints of a diversity of women’s viewpoints, as well as those
of other marginalized groups. According to Christine Sylvester, this viewpoint
argues “that women's biology and-or habitual social assignments as mothers and
caretakers position women against the violence of war as a means of settling
disputes (e.g. Brock-Utne, 1985; Ruddick, 1989), and help them to develop a
politically viable standpoint on wars, peaces, insecurities, and militaristic tamings
in our lives (Reardon, 1985; Enloe, 1983).”6 Feminist postmodernists, on the
other hand, are skeptical about universal categories such as “women” and
“science”, seeking forms of knowledge and truth that show the fractured nature of
identities, allowing them to discover and resolve existing injustices.7

5

True, 213.

6

Sylvester.

7

These definitions are based on several different sources, primarily True, 214,215 and Sylvester,
Christine. Feminist Theory and International Relations in a Postmodern Era. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1994.10,11.

6

There is a general consensus that women value peace more than men, and
several statistical studies do point to the fact that they are more actively
involved in peace movements than men are.8 However, the issue runs much
deeper than whether women are by nature more “peacable” than men:
Virginia Sapiro and Pamela Conover’s analysis of American surveys (dealing
with hypothetical security policies as well as concrete questions about the use
of military force and its consequences) shows that “when we moved from the
abstract to the concrete—from hypothetical wars to the Gulf War—the
distance separating women and men grew, and on every measure, women
reacted more negatively.”9 Some feminists try to distance themselves from
such studies by arguing that they only emphasize differences between
masculine and feminine characteristics, shifting the focus away from the goal
of incorporating women’s contributions into mainstream decision-making
about war and peace. However, others call attention to the difference
concluding that “feminist perspectives on peace, security, and conflict
resolution challenge a traditional understanding of peace processes as the
expression and ratification of power over, such as when one side forces the
other to accept the terms of cease-fire, emphasizing instead an

8

Peach, Lucinda. “An Alternative to Pacifism? Feminism and Just-War Theory,” 1994. Bringing
Peace Home.: Feminism, Violence and Nature. Eds. K.J. Warren and D.L. Cady. Bloomington
and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996. 193.
9

Eichenberg, R.C. “Gender Differences in Public Attitudes toward the Use of Force by the United
States, 1990-2003”. International Security 28.1 (2003):110-41.
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understanding of peace as a process of negotiation and conflict resolution
where both sides come out as winners.”10
This paper’s discussion of feminist ethics integrates these various
discourses into an analysis and critique of just war that illuminates the gendered
nature of war and the war system within which it is embedded, making the case
that just war theory’s efficacy is currently compromised by its containment within
the realist paradigm.
The next chapter proposes the theory of just peace, a holistic theoretical
and practical framework based on the belief that war is not episodic but endemic
within the fabric of our societies. Rather than repudiating the existing world
system, this belief offers the hope that wars can be prevented from within by
creating modes of negotiation and reconciliation practices to reduce and
eventually end the necessity for violence.
This paper contends that just war theory’s usurpation by realism
downplays the important principle of “last resort”, placing war over and above
negotiation and conflict resolution as a viable method for securing peace. It
acknowledges that just war theory can provide a structure for analyzing certain
wars in very specific ways. However, an analysis solely within this framework
cannot offer a comprehensive picture because it does not take into consideration
the wider social and cultural aspects within which the war takes place. Also, its
rhetoric is frequently co-opted to achieve political and social ends (both selfish
10

Rabrenovic, Gordana and Laura Roskos. “Introduction: Civil Society, Feminism, and the
Gendered Politics of War and Peace.” National Women’s Studies Association Journal 13.2
(2001):43.
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and altruistic) that may not be just. In addition, there is a continued shift of
emphasis from jus ad bellum to jus in bello principles, making it easier for
governments to justify wars as long as they are perceived to be complying with
international rules of law. For example:
The United States and it allies practice a new style of legal warfarewhat Schmitt called “Bellum Americanum”-that hinges on precision-guided
bombs, standardized targeting, accepted levels and types of collateral
damage, and high bomber flight altitudes. Once considered obstacles to
the war effort, military lawyers have been integrated into strategic and
tactical decisions, and even accompany troops into battle. Never has the
conduct of war been so legalistic.11
The paper concludes that although just war principles can serve as a
framework for limiting the worst excesses of war, current applications do not
adequately meet the presumption against war and peaceful settlement of
disputes that the theory’s originators envisioned. On the other hand, far from
being a mere synthesis of just war theory and pacifism, just peace is an active
theory that promotes practices leading to the reduction of violence in all arenas
and at all levels, from fights in the schoolyard to ethnic conflicts and beyond.
These practices offer just war theory concrete examples of actions that are
available as “last resorts”, creating the possibility that just war theorists’ debates
will again emphasize the principles used to decide whether a war should be
fought rather than whether a war that has already begun is fought justly.

11

Rengger, 356.
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The History of Just War Theory
Greek and Roman Sources
An unjust peace is better than a just war. ―Marcus Tullius Cicero

Thucydides’ history of the Peloponnesian War, particularly his description
of the Melian Dialogue, suggests that the Greeks approached war from a realist
perspective. In his narrative, the Athenian delegates sent to secure Melian
support in their war respond to the Melian’s desire to remain neutral by
proclaiming: “Our opinion of the gods and our knowledge of men lead us to
conclude that it is a general and necessary law of nature to rule wherever one
can. This is not a law that we made ourselves, nor were we the first to act upon
it when it was made. We found it already in existence, and we shall leave it to
exist for ever among those who come after us. We are merely acting in
accordance with it, and we know that you or anybody else with the same power
as ours would be acting in precisely the same way.” 12
However, several Greek philosophers disagreed with that point of view,
exclaiming that Athens did not fight unjust wars. One of these was Isocrates,
who in his correspondence with the Cypriot prince Nicocles exhorted him to
make no unjust wars, honor all treaties and refrain from the desire to rule all men.
Further, in direct contrast to the Athenian delegation’s reply to the Melians,

12

Thucydides’ The Peloponnesian War, Book 5, Chapter 7, translated by Rex Warner. London:
Penguin, 1955. Quoted in Luard, Evan. Basic Texts in International Relations. New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1992 120-126.
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Isocrates declared that the foreign policy of Athens followed the principle “It is not
just for the strong to rule the weak.”13 Another dissenting voice was
Demosthenes, who praised the justness of the Athenians (in the aftermath of
their defeat in the Peloponnesian Wars) by arguing that Athens was defending all
of the Greeks against Sparta.14 Of course, this rhetoric did not include wars
against the “barbarian” states outside of the Panhellenic arena, as noted by
Doyne Dawson: “Since there was considered little possibility of a reasonable
communication with foreigners, the only way to settle disputes with them was by
battle. And the only norm in such battle was what benefited the city-state and its
needs. All particular actions or general practices in battle were judged solely by
how expedient they were toward military and thus civic success.”15
This ability to separate the Greeks from the “others/barbarians”
allowed them to make a distinction between the morality of wars fought amongst
themselves and those fought with “barbarians”. For example, Plato in his
Republic proposed a new code of warfare in which all wars between the Greek
city-states would be civil wars, with the stipulation that the defeated could not be
enslaved or subjected to occupation or dishonored whereas wars with barbarians

13

References to Isocrates are cited from Dawson, Doyne. The Origins of Western Warfare.
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996. 66. The quote is taken from Isocrate’s On the Peace,
a pamphlet written about 355 B.C. to curb the Athenians’ imperial ambitions. In To Nicocles,
Isocrates further advises the prince to “be polemikos, “warlike,” in always being prepared for war,
but eirenikos, “peacable,” in never going to war without a just cause.”

14

Dawson. 68.

15

LaCroix, W.L. War and International Ethics : Tradition and Today. Lanham, New York &
London: University Press of America,1988. 31. The Greeks believed that foreigners were inferior,
making it possible for them to reconcile their taking of the vanquished as slaves.
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were to be fought with utmost ruthlessness.16 Aristotle expressed this idea in his
Politics, Book VII, 14, 1333b39-1334a2: “Neither should men study war with a
view to the enslavement of those who do not deserve to be enslaved; but first of
all they should provide against their own enslavement, and in the second place
obtain empire for the good of the governed, and not for the sake of exercising a
general despotism, and in the third place they should seek to be masters only
over those who deserve to be slaves.”17
Ironically, Aristotle’s pupil Alexander the Great created a Hellenistic
empire that not only spread Greek culture and influence to the “barbarians” but
had the unforeseen effect of lessening the sharp distinctions drawn between
them by the earlier philosophers. This more cosmopolitan view was reflected in
the philosophical movement known as Stoicism, which had many supporters in
the Greco-Roman world, including the early Christian theologians. The basis of
Stoicism was that nature and the universe were governed by the laws of reason.
It significantly influenced the thought of Marcus Tullius Cicero, a great Roman
statesman and orator (106-43 B.C.), whose writings on war ethics had an
enormous impact on future just war theories. He argued that the Stoic idea of a
universal natural order should be the source of all human laws and communities.
In one of his clearest statements on this concept, he wrote, “that law was neither
a thing contrived by the genius of man, nor established by any decree of the
16

Dawson, 71. Dawson notes that Plato hoped this would make the Greeks unite in slave raids
against barbarian territories, bringing more peace and cooperation between the city-states.
17

Aristotle. The Politics and The Constitution of Athens. trans. Jonathan Barnes, ed. Stephen
Everson Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 188.
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people, but a certain eternal principle, which governs the entire universe.”18 He
applied this principle to war between states in his treatise On Duties: “Then, too,
in the case of a state in its external relations, the rights of war must be strictly
observed. For since there are two ways of settling a dispute: first, by discussion;
second; by physical force; and since the former is characteristic of man, the latter
of the brute, we must resort to force only in case we may not avail ourselves of
discussion. The only excuse, therefore, for going to war is that we may live in
peace unharmed; and when the victory is won, we should spare those who have
not been blood-thirsty and barbarous in their warfare.” 19
This statement, among others, laid the groundwork for subsequent
formulations of the two basic tenets of just war theory: jus ad bellum (just
cause) and jus in bello (just conduct.) Two important principles of jus ad
bellum that he espoused were that just wars could only be waged by
those with the right authority (such as states) and that a formal declaration
of war was required: “As for war, humane laws touching it are drawn up in
the fetial code of the Roman People under all the guarantees of religion;
and from this it may be gathered that no war is just, unless it is entered

18

The Treatises of M.T. Cicero, trans. C.D. Yonge. London: George Bell and sons, 1876. 431,
quoted in Holmes, Robert L. On War and Morality. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1989. 154.
19

Cicero, Marcus Tullius. De Officiis, trans. Walter Miller. Loeb Edition. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1913, Book I.34. The Stoic Legacy to the Renaissance. 5 January 2002.
<www.stoics.com >
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upon after an official demand for satisfaction has been submitted or
warning has been given and a formal declaration made.” 20
Christian Reflections on Just War
The purpose of all wars is peace. ―Saint Augustine of Hippo

The gradual decline of paganism in the Roman Empire through the fourth
century coincided with the elevation of Christians to positions of power. However,
after Constantine’s acceptance of Christianity as the state religion, Rome began
its long and ultimately unsuccessful struggle to stem the tide of aggression by the
Huns, Vandals and Goths along its borders. The Empire’s decline led many of its
citizens to return to paganism, proclaiming that Christianity’s ascendancy had
angered Rome’s gods. As the situation became more perilous the early Christian
pacifist motive gave way to the realization that it would be necessary to take up
arms to defend against the never ending onslaught.
Saint Augustine, considered my many to be the father of modern just war
theory, took on the monumental task of reconciling the peaceful precepts of
Jesus to the political realities of his era: “Like Plato and Cicero, Augustine saw
war as a fact of life. Unlike them, he never saw it as an honorable, let alone
glorious activity. Nor was Augustine’s just war theory simply a Christianization of
Cicero’s natural law thinking…..Augustine struggled to synthesize the rigorous

20

Cicero, Book I.36.
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demands of Christian love with a keen understanding of political realities and a
pessimistic view of human nature.”21
After becoming Bishop of Hippo in North Africa, Augustine strove to find
answers to this dilemma in the Scriptures. His deep-seated pessimism about
human nature stemmed from his belief in the fall of Adam and Eve, which he
assumed was the cause of all war and created in him a worldview that was
inhabited by the saved and the damned. The latter inhabited the “City of Man”
whereas the saved lived in the “City of God.” Developing Cicero’s concept of just
war, Augustine set down the first condition that the sole right to wage war must
be given by the proper authority. His second condition was that war must be
fought with the intention of re-establishing a just peace: “Even wicked men wage
war to maintain the peace of their own circle, and wish that if possible all men
belonged to them, that all men and things might serve but one head, and might
either through love or fear yield themselves to peace with him.”22 His major break
from Cicero and the Greek philosophers was his repudiation of glory as a proper
justification for war. He saw warfare as the greatest of all evils, asking “Why
allege to me the mere names and words of “glory” and “victory”? Tear off the
disguise of wild delusion, and look at the naked deeds; weigh them naked, judge
them naked.”23

21

Adenay, Bernard T. Just War, Political Realism, and Faith. Metuchen, N.J. & London: The
American Theological Library Association, 1988.

22

Augustine, The City of God, Marcus Dods, trans., Great Books of the Western World, vol. 18.
Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1957, Bk. XII, Ch. 22, 357. Quoted in Adeney, p. 30.

23

Augustine, III, Ch. 13, 174.
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Secular Revisions
I saw in the whole Christian world a license of fighting at which even barbarous
nations might blush. Wars were begun on trifling pretexts or none at all, and carried
on without any reference of law, Divine or human."
--Hugo Grotius

The disintegration of Rome into warring factions led to a period of
centuries during which just war theory was largely ignored. Later theorists, most
importantly Thomas Aquinas, Hugo Grotius and Francisco di Vitoria built on
Augustine’s model to develop a set of rules and regulations that promoted the
proper conduct of war, leading to a clearer delineation between jus ad bellum
and jus in bello principles. This latter set of principles added another facet to the
theory by requiring that the agents of war be held responsible for their actions.24
The rules of just cause remained basically the same during this period: having
just cause, being declared by the right authority, and having peace as the goal.
However, the jus in bello principle of discrimination, concerning who were the
legitimate targets of war, became an important part of the tradition during this
time.
Although Aquinas was a religious thinker, he began the process of
secularizing just war doctrine by revitalizing Aristotle’s thoughts in his seminal
work Summa Theologica to create the theological system upon which the
modern Catholic Church is based. Here, he defined natural law as something
that could be discerned without divine inspiration, stating that “the rule and
measure of human acts is the reason, which is the first principle of human acts."
24

Mosely, Alex. “Just War Theory”, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2001 15 June 2002.
<http://www.utm.edu/ research/iep/j/justwar.htm >
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25

He used this law to refine Augustine’s precepts for just war by using reason

alone. Also, the “doctrine of double effect”, a rule of conduct that proved
valuable in later just war thinking, was often attributed to Aquinas because of his
argument that “Nothing hinders one act from having two effects, only one of
which is intended, while the other is beside the intention.”26 Simply put, the
doctrine maintained that it may be permissible to perform a good act with the
knowledge that bad consequences will ensue, but that it is always wrong
intentionally to do a bad act for the sake of good consequences that will ensue.
Later theologians, particularly the Jesuit priest Jean Pierre Gury, developed this
principle, making it applicable to a host of moral and theological issues. However,
it was Francisco de Vitoria in the 16th century who first applied it to the jus in bello
question of how to treat non-combatants in war. In his lecture De indis, he
considered the problem of violence committed by the conquistadors against
Indians during their conquest of Peru. He concluded that the Indians had rights
equal to the Spaniards and could not be treated as inferior beings that could be
exploited and enslaved. This led to the creation of jus gentium, or the law of
nations, establishing international norms of behavior among nations based on
natural law. In response to the misery brought about by improvements in military
technology combined with the voracious power struggles between monarchs
during the Renaissance, de Vitoria, along with fellow Scholastic Francisco
25

Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica First Part of the Second Part, Q. 90, trans. Fathers of the
English Dominican Province, (Benziger Bros. Edition, 1947) 15 June 2002.
http://www.ccel.org/a/aquinas/summa/FS/FS090.html#FSQ90OUTP1
26

Aquinas, Second Part of the Second Part, Q. 67.
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Suarez, added further conditions for just war: first, that the means employed in
the fighting of war should be proportionate to the ends; second that all peaceful
alternatives should be exhausted; and third, that there should a reasonable hope
of victory. There are opposing camps on the issue of who was the “father of
international law”, Vitoria or Hugo Grotius. Most secular writers side with Grotius,
the author of the famous treatise De Jure Belli ac Pacis (On the Rights of War
and Peace). Here, he attempted to ground just war precepts on natural law
rather than Christian doctrine, recognizing two alternatives to divine law: the law
of nature and the law of nations. Influenced by Aquinas, Grotius’ law of nature
was derived from universal truths understood through human reason. The law of
nations was derived from customary practices and relationships between states
in the real world.27
Just War Theory in the Twentieth Century
War is so awful that it makes us cynical about the possibility of restraint, and then
it is so much worse that it makes us indignant at the absence of restraint. Our
cynicism testifies to the defectiveness of the war convention, and our indignation
to its reality and strength.
— Michael Walzer

Just war theory was further codified into international law when two
documents were issued in the wake of World War II: the Nuremburg and United
Nations Charters. The first charter established the conditions constituting unjust
acts in the course of war. 28 The United Nations Charter, especially Article 51,

27

Roosevelt, Grace. “A Brief History of the Quest for Peace: Pacifism and Just War Theory in
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declared the right of sovereign nations to self-defense. However, it was largely
ignored as a theory until the mid-twentieth century, when it became a
cornerstone for arguments against the nuclear arms race and the Vietnam War.
In response to the threat of nuclear war during the height of the Cold War, The
United States Catholic Conference issued The Challenge of Peace: God’s
Promise and Our Response in 1983, a comprehensive evaluation of just war
doctrine condemning the use of nuclear weapons and laying out plans for
shaping a peaceful world. Its just war criteria are shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Just War Criteria
jus ad bellum: why and when recourse to war is permissible
1. Just Cause
War is permissible only to confront a ‘real and certain danger’
To preserve innocent life, to preserve conditions necessary for
decent human existence and to secure basic human rights.
2.

Competent
Authority
Comparative
Justice

War must be declared by those with responsibility for public
order, not by private groups or individuals.
3.
Do the rights and values involved justify killing? In other words,
which side is sufficiently ‘right’ in the dispute, and are the values
at stake critical enough o override the presumption against war?
4. Right Intention
This has two parts. In just cause, war can be intended only for
the reasons set forth in just cause. During the conflict, it
includes the pursuit of peace and reconciliation and avoiding
unnecessarily destructive acts or unreasonable conditions.
5. Last resort
All peaceful alternatives must be exhausted. Here the Bishops
stress the importance of the United Nations as a governing body
that can help alleviate some of the problems inherent in these
criteria.
6. Probability of
The purpose of these criteria, although difficult to apply, is to
Success
prevent irrational resort to force or hopeless resistance when the
outcome of either will clearly be disproportionate or futile.
7 Proportionality
The damage to be inflicted and the costs incurred must be
proportionate to the good expected by taking up arms.
jus in bello: how the war should be conducted
1. Discrimination
Requirement to avoid killing non-combatants, a criterion that is
becoming harder to comply with.
2. Proportionality
Each action must be judged according to the level of force
required, with the least possible force used to achieve victory.
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However, modern just war theory owes a great debt to Just and Unjust
Wars, Michael Walzer’s attempt to establish a constructivist (as opposed to
realist) secular and modern version of just war based on linking states’ rights to
individual rights rather than the rights of princes as earthly representatives of
God’s authority:
The rights of states rest on the consent of their members. But this is
consent of a special sort. State rights are not constituted through a series
of transfers from individual men and women to the sovereign . . . what
actually happens . . . [is that] over a long period of time, shared
experiences and cooperative activity of many different kinds shape a
common life . . . most states do stand guard over the community of their
citizens, at least to some degree: that is why we assume the justice of
their defensive wars.29
Through this linkage, Walzer sets up a “legalist paradigm” of six
principles that must be shared by states in the international arena:
1. There exists an international society of sovereign states.
2. This international society has laws that establishes the right of its
members – above all, the rights of territorial integrity and political
sovereignty
3. Any use of force or imminent threat of force by one state against the
political sovereignty of another constitutes aggression and is a criminal
act.
4. Aggression justifies two kinds of violent response: a war of self-defense
by the victim and a war of law enforcement by the victim and any other
member of international society.
5. Nothing but aggression can justify war.
6. Once the aggressor state has been militarily repulsed, it can also be
punished.30
However, he argues that in some cases, any or all of these principles may
need to be violated, even advocating the use of “pre-emptive” attacks in

29 Michael Walzer. Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, Second
edition, New York: Basic Books, 1992. 53–4.
30 Walzer.,61–2.
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situations where there is a manifest intent to injure, proof of preparation that
shows the intent to be a danger, or a general situation in which the risk of defeat
is greatly increased if war is delayed. One example is the Israeli strike on Egypt,
June 5, 1967 during the Six-Day War, just after Egypt had declared its intention
of extermination. 31
He also revises earlier discussions of the “doctrine of double effect” by
offering three conditions that must be met to reconcile effects (such as the killing
of non-combatants) emanating from actions made with just intent. First, the
direct effect must be morally acceptable (for example, the desired result is the
destruction of a legitimate military target.) Second, the actor’s intention must be
good, and the bad effect not intentional. In this case, the actor should not use
the bad effect as a means to the ends. For example, it is wrong to target civilians
for the purpose of weakening an enemy’s resolve. Third, the good effect must be
sufficiently good to justify the bad effect. Here again, he advocates the violation
of one of the principles, namely the second condition, by proposing his
controversial notion of “supreme emergency”, in which unjust means may be
justified in rare cases, using the example of Britain’s carpet bombing of Dresden
as justifiable because of the need to combat the “abominable evil” of the Hitler
regime. Nonetheless, he concludes that this conduct must be eschewed when
the aim is reached, with immediate reinstatement of the just war criteria that were
violated. In his review of Walzer’s book, Gilbert Meilaender describes how
Britain resolved this dilemma after World War II:
31 Walzer. 81.

21

After the bombing of German cities had succeeded and the war had
been won, Britain needed to find a way to reinstate the moral rules it
had—in the moment of supreme emergency—overridden. Walzer
interprets the dishonoring of Arthur Harris as such a reinstatement. Harris
had directed the British Bomber Command’s campaign of terror against
German cities. He had, it is perhaps not too strong to say, been good
enough to be on the right side but not too good to do what was needed in
Britain’s time of peril.
After the war he expected his reward: public honor. He received
none, however, and finally left Britain and returned to his native Rhodesia.
By dishonoring him, Britain dissociated itself from what had been done—it
reinstated the moral code. We may, Walzer grants, feel that this is not
quite fair to Harris, but it may be the best a people can manage.32
Brian Orend incorporates Walzer’s human rights approach to launch a
fresh interpretation of just war theory based on the works of Immanuel Kant. The
importance of this thesis lies in its emphasis on an aspect of just war that is
virtually ignored by most other theorists: the jus post bellum principles applying to
the end process of creating a just peace. He divides this final component into
short term and long term principles. The short term principles deal with the
termination of conflicts as they relate to specific wars. The long term principles
have a more ambitious agenda, the progressive elimination of war in general.
This dichotomy represents the inherent tension between what Orend believes are
the two necessary ingredients for the complete just war theory that the Kantian
method provides: a comprehensive theoretical framework and a set of principles
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for practical application. Table 2 completes the picture of just war theory as it
stands today. 33
Table 2: Just War Criteria (addition)
jus post bellum: when and how war is concluded
1. Just Cause for
A state has just cause to seek termination of the just war in question if
termination
there has been a reasonable vindication of those rights whose violation
grounded the resort to war in the first place.
2.

Right Intention

3.

4.

Public
declaration and
legitimate
authority
Discrimination

5.

Proportionality

A state must intend to carry out the process of war termination only in
terms of those principles contained in the other jus post bellum rules.
Revenge is strictly ruled out as an animating force. Furthermore, the just
state in question must commit itself to symmetry and equal application with
regard to the investigation and prosecution of any jus in bello war crimes.
The terms of the peace must be publicly proclaimed by a legitimate
authority.
In setting the terms of the peace, the just and victorious state is to
differentiate between the political and military leaders, the soldiers and the
civilian population within the aggressor regime.
Terms of peace are proportional to reasonable rights vindication and do
not violate the human rights of the populace, thereby negating the concept
of unconditional surrender.
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Feminist Analysis of Just War
Introduction
Where are the women? ―Cynthia Enloe

A commentary written by journalist Cynthia Peters in the online magazine
ZNET evokes the frustration that feminists feel about the roles that women are
designated to play in wartime. To illustrate this point, she quotes the headline of
a satirical piece in Onion Magazine: “Not Knowing What Else to Do, Woman
Bakes American Flag Cake.” Continuing with the story, she quotes: “Having
already donated blood, mailed a check to the Red Cross, and sent a letter of
thanks to the New York Fire Department, she settled on the red, white, and blue
creation as her next response to the terror.”34
Lucinda Peach describes a possible reason for this frustration: “Women
remain largely absent from ethical and policy debates regarding when to go to
war, how to fight a war, and whether resorting to war is morally justifiable.”35 One
explanation for this absence is that the making, waging and concluding of wars
has traditionally been male-centric. As the previous chapter shows, just war
theory follows this tradition by being almost exclusively written by and for men.
Within the time between the two Gulf wars with Iraq, there have been very few
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feminist voices to be heard in these mainstream debates, with the exception of
Jean Bethke Elshtain, who has written several books on various theoretical and
specific aspects of this topic. However, it is possible to construct a feminist
vision of just war and peace by examining the variety of feminist based
approaches to ethics that have developed in response to the underrating of
women’s moral experience. The first section of this chapter provides an
historical overview of feminist moral approaches, concentrating primarily on
those issues related to war and peace. The second section delineates feminist
critiques of contemporary applications of just war theory. The chapter concludes
that contemporary just war theory lacks the depth and breadth necessary to
confront issues such as intra- and non-state forms of violence.
Feminist Ethics
Feminist ethics is born of women's refusals to endure with grace the arrogance,
indifference, hostility, and damage of oppressively sexist environments.
—Claudia Card

Despite the fractured nature of the “feminist critique” of ethics36, all of the
various discourses ultimately “attempt to revise, reformulate, or rethink those
aspects of traditional western ethics that depreciate or devalue women's moral
experience” to “create a gender-equal ethics, a moral theory that generates non-
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sexist moral principles, policies, and practices.” 37 These discourses are most
often divided into three broad categories:
Feminist Empiricism
Feminist empiricists argue that gender-biased science only creates “bad
epistemology,” arguing that once these biases are eliminated (by throwing more
women and other minorities into the mix), a value-neutral epistemology will
ensue to liberate knowledge. This argument coincides with liberal feminism,
which contends that gender equality can be gained by winning equal access to
the educational and political rights enjoyed by men within the existing system.
There are several critiques of liberal feminism worth noting. First, other feminists
argue that this position accepts male values as human values and assumes that
women can and should aspire to be like men. Another critique closely related to
the first is that “male” standards are valued higher than those associated with
women, such as interdependence and caring. A third critique cites its emphasis
of individual rights over the common good. However, this feminist viewpoint
remains popular with many women and women’s organizations that work to
promote gender equality throughout the world. Due to their efforts, more and
more women are inhabiting spaces that were formerly the exclusive enclaves of
men and demanding equal positions of respect (as evidenced by the growing
participation of women in politics and the military in the United States.) Liberal
feminists usually reject the idea that women are more peaceful than men by
37

Tong, Rosemarie, "Feminist Ethics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2002
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), 23 March 2003. < http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminismethics/ >

26

nature and argue that to effect change; they need to demand an equal voice and
role in international decision-making positions, including roles in the military.
Standpoint Feminism
Standpoint feminists assert that knowledge is socially constructed. They
view women's marginal position in society as a potential advantage rather than
merely as an oppressive situation for women. They argue from the Marxist
position that a socially oppressed class has valuable knowledge that is
unavailable to the privileged class by the mere fact that it is oppressed, and
therefore attempts to incorporate the standpoints of other marginalized groups in
its quest for knowledge. One argument for the value of this theory is that
“knowledge which emerges from women’s experiences ‘on the margins’ of world
politics is actually more neutral and critical because it is not complicit with, or
blinded by, existing institutions and power relations.”38 Most standpoint feminists
view war from the perspective that exclusion from power leads women to be
more peaceable than men because they must bargain from a position of
weakness.
Within standpoint, the “ethics of care” approach is the predominant theory
that speaks to the issues of war and peace. This theory was born when Carol
Gilligan published a very influential book in 1982 called In a Different Voice,
where she described her experiments on how men and women react to various
hypothetical situations. This book was prompted by her professor Lawrence
Kohlberg’s contention that there were six stages of moral development ,
38
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concluding that only men could reach the highest stage of an “impartial,
universalist, and principled perspective: the ethics of justice.39 In reply, her book
proposed that Kohlberg’s results were mistaken because they were based on
“male-biased” methodology that did not take into account the possibility of
different kinds of ethical behaviour. Rather, her study revealed that men and
women have fundamentally different approaches to morality: women focus more
on ‘care’ and men on ‘justice’. Women base their morality on relationships and
responsibility, whereas men focus on the traditional western ethics of rationalism,
Kantianism, and liberalism.
Nel Noddings expanded on Gilligan’s “ethics of care”, using an approach
emphasizing particular others as the objects of care:
To act as one-caring ... is to act with special regard for the particular
person in a concrete situation ... she acts in a nonrule-bound fashion
in behalf of the cared for ... [An ethic of care] does not attempt to
reduce the need for human judgment with a series of “Thou shalts”
and “Thou shalt nots”. Rather, it recognizes and calls forth human
judgment across a wide range of fact and feeling, and it allows for
situations and conditions in which judgment (in the impersonal, logical
sense) may properly be put aside in favor of faith and commitment.40
Along this vein, maternal feminists such as Sara Ruddick, Virginia Held,
and Caroline Whitbeck, commemorate the feminine characteristics of mothering
and parenting, arguing that “the experience of mothering, of caring for others
could serve as an important ethical model for civic participation as well as a
39
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corrective to citizenship based on military service.”41 Developing this proposal,
Ruddick makes the case that mothering and war are incompatible:
When maternal thinking takes upon itself the critical perspective of
a feminist standpoint, it reveals a contradiction between mothering
and war. Mothering begins in birth and promises life; military
thinking justifies organized, deliberate deaths. A mother preserves
the bodies, nurtures the psychic growth and disciplines the
conscience of children; although the military trains its soldiers to
survive the situations it puts them in, it also deliberately endangers
their bodies, minds and consciences in the name of victory and
abstract causes.42
Feminists and non-feminists alike criticize these approaches for their
emphasis on the specific relationships engendered by individual human
relationships, arguing that they don’t translate into a general model that can be
used to describe other types of relationships such as those between communities
and groups. Ruddick herself concedes that she might be “over-idealizing
mothers, unnecessarily excluding men and nonbiological mothers from maternal
work, and underemphasizing the differences that exist among mothers, some of
whom find themselves "mothering" under extremely oppressive circumstances.”43
Other critics argue that this stress on personal relationships creates a “partialist”
approach in the ethics of care that must be integrated with the universal and
rational ethics related to the “justice” orientation: “This means that unless
exponents of a personal ethics of care wanted to take the hard-nosed view that
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we never have any moral duties and responsibilities to those with whom we have
no personal relationships, they would still need to devise and defend some
ethical principles to govern our relationship with strangers. . . . An adequate
ethics needs impartiality as well as care.”44 Nonetheless, standpoint feminists’
emphasis on particularity and personal experience creates the ability to identify
with and take responsibility for the suffering of others, as seen in growing
movements such as Women in Black, begun in 1988 by Israeli women
empathizing with the plight of Palestinian women by protesting against Israel’s
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. Also, their emphasis on the necessity of
incorporating multiple “standpoints” allows for ethical consideration of the diverse
perspectives of parties to any dispute or conflict.45
Postmodern Feminism
“Postmodern feminism” is not easily definable, incorporating so many
diverging viewpoints as to make the term almost meaningless as well as
unfashionable in some circles. However, this paper characterizes it as a reaction
against the scientific method that disputes the definition of reality from
objective/subjective or empirical/normative stances. Rather, many of these
feminists view reality as structured by discourse representing relations of power
and domination, agreeing that the male/female dichotomy is a main categorizing
force in our society. They criticize the structure of this society and the dominant
patriarchal order within which women and other marginalized people are
44
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perceived as the Other. Furthermore, they perceive any attempts to label their
viewpoints as essentialist fallacies.
As postmodern feminists see it, all attempts to provide a single
explanation for women's oppression not only will fail but should also fail.
They will fail because there is no one entity, "Woman," upon whom a label
may be fixed. Women are individuals, each with a unique story to tell
about a particular self. Moreover, any single explanation for "Woman's"
oppression should fail from a feminist point of view, for it would be yet
another instance of so-call "phallogocentric" thought: that is, the kind of
"male thinking" that insists on telling as absolute truth one and only one
story about reality. Women must, in the estimation of postmortem
feminists reveal their differences to each other so that they can better
resist the patriarchal tendency to center, congeal, and cement thought into
a rigid "truth" that always was, is, and forever will be.46
Although not known as a “postmodern” feminist, Jean Bethke Elshtain uses a
Foucauldian linguistic constructivism to examine the traditional roles played by
women and men in war, concluding that they are socially constructed by the
dominant historical narratives about the male “Just Warrior”/ hero who fights for
the greater good and the female “Beautiful Soul” who plays the maternal support
figure in need of male protection.
To take up war-as-discourse compels us to recognize the powerful
sway of received narratives and reminds us that the concepts
through which we think about war, peace, and politics get repeated
endlessly, shaping debates, constraining consideration of
alternatives, often reassuring us that things cannot really be much
different than they are. As we nod an automatic "yes" when we
hear the truism (though we may despair of the truth it tells) that
"there have always been war," we acknowledge tacitly that "there
have always been war stories," for wars are deeded to us as texts.
We cannot identify "war itself" as an entity apart from a tradition
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that includes poems, epics, myths, official histories, and first-person
accounts, as well as articulated theories.47
Elshtain’s war-as-discourse analysis precludes the supposition that there
is a link between women and peace, proposing instead that women’s attitudes
about war and peace can differ substantially depending on such factors as time
periods and cultures.48 She suggests that this linkage belies the fact that peace
feminists are usually greatly outnumbered by the majority of women who support
the wars that their nations wage, citing the example of women in the suffragist
movement who rushed to support the war effort at the outbreak of the First World
War while others handed out white feathers as symbols of cowardice to young
men not in uniform. 49
In Gender and ‘Postmodern’ War, Robin Schott proposes that
“postmodern understandings of persons, states, and politics …render an event
based conception of war inadequate, especially insofar as gender is taken into
account.”50
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Feminist Critiques of Just War Theory
But history, real solemn history, I cannot be interested in... I read it a little
as a duty, but it tells me nothing that does not either vex or weary me. The
quarrels of popes and kings, with wars or pestilences, in every page; the men all
so good for nothing, and hardly any women at all--it is very tiresome. —Jane
Austen's Catherine Morland in Northanger Abbey

What are the criticisms that feminists have about just war theory?
Although few feminist scholars explicitly focus on this topic (Elshtain, Cohn &
Ruddick in particular), others address similar issues within the broader scope of
war and peace. Lucinda Peach groups these criticisms around several concerns:
“its close relationship with realism, its failure to insist that all criteria have been
satisfied in accordance with rigorous standards, especially in relation to
attempting nonviolent alternatives; its tendency to abstract and to dichotomize
reality in accordance with gendered distinctions; and the priority it accords to the
state and to state authority vis-à-vis the individual.”51 All of these are legitimate
concerns, but she misses one very important criticism of just war theory: it
addresses war as a discrete event rather than a continuing presence in modern
culture.
Realism
Realists concentrate on states and their power relationships as the
most important aspect of world politics. Hans Morgenthau, a primary architect of
this theory, assumed that “statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as
power,” creating a world system with an “astounding continuity in foreign power
which makes American, British, or Russian foreign policy appear as an
51
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intelligible, rational continuum, by and large consistent within itself, regardless of
the different motives, preferences, and intellectual and moral qualities of
successive statesmen.”52 Sara Ruddick and Carol Cohn, identifying themselves
anti-war feminists, believe that those who practice this type of politics view war
as an inescapable part of this system. They further declare that although just
war theorists use normative methods to analyze the justice of wars, their theory
resides within the parameters of this realist assumption of war’s inevitability,
therefore accepting war as a practice. Cohn and Ruddick, on the other hand,
reject war as a practice (while distinguishing themselves from pacifists by
acknowledging those among them who continue to support particular military
campaigns.)53
However, Elshtain distinguishes the spirit of just war theory as “a way of
thinking that refuses to separate politics from ethics” 54, from the realist world
where “no children are ever born, and nobody ever dies…There are states, and
they are what is.”55 She argues that just war thinking is not inextricably linked to
the realist paradigm, transcending the use of its rhetoric by realist states to
52
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legitimize their struggles for power, asserting that “traditional just-war theory is
not problematic so much because it is itself realist as because it is anachronistic
and no longer able to provide meaningful limits to war in a world governed by
realist assumptions.”56 For her, Michael Walzer’s argument that in the face of
“immeasurable evil” (i.e. Nazism), a “supreme emergency” exists allowing the
use of unjust means to achieve victory is a clear example of how realists violate
the principles of just war for their own purposes.57 On the other hand, she
maintains that “when a wound as grievous as that of September 11 has been
inflicted on a body politic, it would be the height of moral irresponsibility… were
the relevant governments to fail to respond” by applying just war theory to
exercise armed force in a responsible and limited manner.58
Failure to Consider Alternatives to War
Just war theory clearly states that a governing authority must reasonably exhaust
all other diplomatic and non-military options for securing peace before resorting
to force. However, The United States Bishops’ treatise The Challenge of Peace
is the only document on just war that attempts to fully delineate nonviolent
alternatives to war and escalation of conflicts. It is an impassioned reaction and
statement against the use of
nuclear weapons, and one of the first appeals for just peacemaking as an
alternative to war:
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We are the first generation since Genesis with the power to virtually
destroy God's creation. We cannot remain silent in the face of such
danger. Peacemaking is not an optional commitment. It is a requirement of
our faith. We are called to be peacemakers, not by some movement of the
moment, but by our Lord Jesus.59
For Walzer, these statements prove his contention that a last resort could
turn into “an endlessly receding possibility, invoked mostly by people who would
prefer never to resist aggression with force. After all, there is always something
else to do, another diplomatic note, another meeting.”60 To feminists, this position
underscores the fact that “last resort” criteria are seldom fully considered before
hostilities are instigated. According to Elshtain, “the American public seems at
this point so inured to the rather routine use of American bombing in foreign
policy situations that these actions scarcely register on the radar screen most of
the time.”61
Abstract Thought/Dichotomized Thinking
Feminist analyses “specifically reveal how abstraction in the application of
just war theory has resulted in (1) a neglect of the horrors of war and its effects
on individual bodies;(2) a perception of the enemy as “Other”; and (3) a fixation
on principles of justice and rights rather than the needs and interests of specific
persons in particular conflicts.”62
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For instance, a feminist former RAF officer in the Persian Gulf conflict
illustrates the moment in which she recognized the duality in which the suffering
of individuals was viewed:
Around one week into the “conflict” proper, by which time we had lost
several crews from our base during bombing raids, I heard the voices of
some downed aircrew on CNN—two of whom were my colleagues. I was
overjoyed that they had survived. Later, as I watched the video footage of
their battered faces, and the news teams discussed the Iraqi breaking of
the Geneva Convention through beating up downed aircrew, I realized
how utterly stupid the whole thing was. We had been “bombing the shit”
out of Iraq for days. There were obviously many Iraqis being killed. But
beating up captured aircrew who had just bombed you was “barbaric” and
“against the rules.”63
This dichotomy is also apparent in the American media’s coverage of
September 11’s victims as opposed to the civilian victims of the war in
Afghanistan. When the New York Times put a human face to the thousands who
perished in the Twin Towers by featuring vignettes with pictures and minibiographies listing the victims’ interests and families, they created an
ineradicable image by visualizing the personal aspects of the loss. Howard Zinn
was deeply moved by those intimate glimpses of the real people lost in the
tragedy, speculating “what if all those Americans who declare their support for
Bush's "war on terrorism" could see, instead of those elusive symbols--Osama
bin Laden, Al Qaeda--the real human beings who have died under our bombs?”64
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Ira Chernus relates how President Eisenhower’s administration exploited this
good/evil rhetoric in its foreign policy:
Everything had to be woven into the system (as loosely articulated as it
was) and circumscribed within its absolute demarcations between truth
and falsehood, right and wrong. Therefore all realities had to be
dichotomized; everything had to be treated only in relation to its absolute
opposite. Dichotomizing and polarizing were the only path he could see
leading to clarity. In political terms, freedom, capitalism, and "the American
way" could be meaningful only if pitted against their absolute opposites.
Hence the need to construct discursively an imminent foreign and
domestic "Red menace," so that the nation could be called to make a
decisive choice between the opposites.65
Feminists argue that just war theory stresses the notions of just/unjust and
good/evil wars, reinforcing the ability to abstract the enemy as the “Other”,
making their annihilation much more palatable. Further, standpoint feminists
argue that its emphasis on rights and justice promotes separation rather than
connection, leading to the likelihood of more, not less recourse to aggression. If,
for example, the victor’s terms of justice in the wake of the war are perceived as
unduly harsh by the vanquished, will the end of war bring a true peace?
“Typically”, Cohn and Ruddick state, “‘peace’ includes official ongoing
“punishment”—retribution, reparations, domination, and deprivation.”66 This is
evident in Orend’s jus post bellum principles, which emphasize rights vindication
and the question of punishment over mediation and reconciliation. Issues such
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as war crimes trials are more comfortable within this framework than discussions
of creating a just peace.67
Suppression of Individual Rights by the State
Just war theory requires that a war must be endorsed by a person or entity
that has the proper authority to do so, privileging the rights of the state over the
rights of individuals in the name of the “common good”. Government reactions to
catastrophic events such as September 11, including the passing of legislation,
(i.e. Patriot Act I) or the detention of certain individuals based on their ethnicity
(Japanese internments during World War II) within the atmosphere of war allows
what Sara Ruddick calls just war’s “unquestioning obedience as a virtue.”68
Further, just war theorists since the Peace of Westphalia have focused on the
sovereign state as the only actor, that is, the actor that plays the critical role in
matters of war, ignoring the growing number of non-state actors in the
international arena. In relation to feminist theory, especially the ethics of care,
this emphasis on states over individuals fails to recognize the importance of
interpersonal a well as interstate relations.
War as Event
According to Barbara Ehrenreich, those who study war empirically as a
recurrent event speak of its “epidemicity”—its tendency to spread in a manner
corresponding to an infectious disease. In other words, as Dutch social scientist
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Henk Houweling observes, “one of the causes of war is war itself”.69
Analogously, many feminists refuse to regard war as a series of discrete events
(threat followed by invasion, battle, then ceasefire), considering it instead as a
systematic expression of the society within which it resides, so that “in contrast to
much just war theory, it …[does] not separate war from either the preparations
made for it (preparations taken in the widest possible, including the social costs
of maintaining large standing armies and the machinery of deterrence), or from
its long term physical, psychological, socio-economic, environmental, and
gendered effects.70 In fact, ethical approaches such as just war theory that “do
not attend to the ways in which warfare and military practices are woven into the
very fabric of life in twenty-first century technological states lead to crisis-based
politics and analyses.”71
Conclusion
In the just war scenario, there are only two sides, the aggressor and the
victim, the victor and the vanquished. However, the real world also contains an
entire set of people who aren’t on either side, neither aggressor nor victim, with
little or no stake in who wins or loses. According to the anthropologist William
Ury, this group is the “Third Side” that can step in to resolve or lessen tensions
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and conflicts.72 His assertion that peace is the norm rather than war introduces
the next chapter’s discussion of just peace.
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Just Peace Theory

"The third side is a kind of social immune system that prevents the spread of the virus of
violence."—William Ury

Introduction

William Ury questions the Hobbesian outlook that only a strong government
can restrain human nature’s tendency to war and violence. Drawing on the works
of Frans de Waal (Primate Behavior and Human Aggression, which questions the
myth that humans are innately aggressive) and R. Brian Ferguson (The History
of War: Fact vs. Fiction, which uses archeological evidence to prove that most of
human history was peaceful rather than warlike), he asks how our ancestors
were able to resolve conflict so successfully for so long? He formulated his
answer while performing fieldwork among tribes like the Bushmen of Kalahari,
observing the way in which family, friends and the extended community
intervened to resolve issues between contending parties. He realized that
conflicts never take place in a vacuum, strictly between two adversaries. “In a
nutshell," Ury explains, "the third side is composed of people from the community
using a certain kind of power, the power of peers, from a certain perspective,
which is a perspective of common ground; supporting a certain process, which is
the process of dialogue and nonviolence; and aiming for a certain product, which
42

is a triple win--a solution that's good for the community and good for both of the
parties." 73
Ury recognizes that conflict is natural and advocates positive interaction
rather than mere opposition from outside, providing concrete practices for “third
siders” to play in bringing resolution to conflicts. Ury’s ten roles that “third siders”
can play are:
1. Provider: helping people meet their frustrated needs
2. Teacher: instilling skills or attitudes to defuse tensions
3. Bridge Builder: fostering good relationships across potential lines of
conflict
4. Mediator: helping people reconcile their opposite interests
5. Arbiter: delineating the disputed rights
6. Equalizer: balancing the power between clashing parties
7. Healer: repairing injured relationships and defusing wounded emotions
8. Witness: taking heed and note of early warning signs of dispute
9. Referee: establishing objective rules for conflict
10. Peace Keeper: stepping in to separate the fighting parties, even
physically.74
How can “third-siders” work to prevent conflicts before they happen?
They can be providers, teachers and bridge-builders. How do they contain wars
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while they are happening? They witness, referee, and act as peacekeepers.
How can they resolve conflicts? They can mediate, arbitrate, equalize and heal.
As Ury notes, “No one third-side role is sufficient to stop violence. The roles
constitute a series of protective safety nets. If one doesn’t catch the conflict and
stop it from escalating, another will. Together, these roles constitute a systemic
approach to what is, after all, a systemic problem.”75 A similar set of principles
and roles are found in the ten principles espoused in the book Just
Peacekeeping (included in Appendix A).
Feminist Just Peace
Unlike William Ury’s ten roles or Glen Stassen’s Ten Principles of
Peacemaking, there are no written “feminist principles of just peace”.
Liberal feminists prefer to work within the prevailing patriarchical system to
win equal rights and access for marginalized groups. In keeping with this stance,
most embrace just war theory, with certain reservations. Elshtain is a strong
advocate for using just war principles as long as they are not couched in realist
terms. She appeals for a return to emphasis on the jus ad bellum principles
founded by Saint Augustine. Neta Crawford is not quite as enamored, stating that
“each conflict demands its own analysis, which must occur prior to and
throughout a war”, and although just war theory is a useful tool for this purpose,
“it must be understood as only a crutch or partial palliative until the underlying
pathologies can be understood, prevented and cured by more powerful
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medicine.”76 What these voices bring to feminist just peace is a commitment to
the use of strong principles before the initiation of hostilities. Most importantly,
just war theory’s principle of “last resort” can be resuscitated and placed within a
visible and active just peace framework.
Ury’s concept of just peace is not new to women, who have long played
these “third-sider” roles within their societies. According to anti-militarist
feminists (standpoint feminists among them), the problem lies in the fact that the
contributions of women and other marginalized groups remain largely
unrecognized at institutional and policy levels. However, because of this limited
access to traditional avenues of power in decision making roles within
governments and institutions, women have focused on grass roots organizing
and non-governmental organizations as a means to power, managing to express
their interests and concerns and placing feminist issues on national, regional and
international arenas. The Women and Armed Conflict List Archives77 provide a
fascinating array of examples of such grass-root efforts from around the world.
The views expressed in this archive “indicate that women and their organizations
make use of innovative strategies for peace negotiation, peacemaking and
peacebuilding….their main strategies suggest not only alternative means of
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doing politics and peacemaking, but also alternate understandings of politics and
peacemaking.”78
One cooperative effort to raise women’s’ public visibility and effect change
is Women Waging Peace, a website launched in 1999 at Harvard’s Kennedy
School of Government which creates a network of women in multiple conflict
areas around the world who are “all demonstrated leaders among women peace
builders, are elected and appointed government officials; directors of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); lawyers, scholars, and educators; business,
military, and religious leaders; representatives of multilateral organizations; and
journalists.”79 This project allows peacemakers with a variety of skills and
experiences to interact with each other, studying the work that they do in diverse
conflict situations and roles and advocating the inclusion of women in local and
international efforts to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts. Another avenue
was made possible by The International Women's Conference in Beijing, China
which played a large role in the creation of the International Criminal Court; the
passing of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on issues of women, security
and peace on October 31, 2000; and peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo and in East Timor.80 The concerted effort of the transnational
Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice succeeded in their relentless determination
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to bring charges of rape and sexual enslavement, issues traditionally relegated to
the private sphere, against three Serbian men in the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, an important milestone in the fight to bring
recognition to these crimes as forms of violence and subjugation. 81
An illustration of the power of witnessing and narrating truth is the Denshō
Project, a digital archive of videotaped interviews, historic photographs and
documents narrated by Japanese women and men of the Pacific Northwest that
balances the “dominant narratives of regional history that minimize women’s
experiences and foreground ‘‘heroic’’ actions of white males.”82
In one narrative, peace activist Aki Kurose states, “Always realize that not
to get involved when you should get involved is an act of violence.” 83
Hannah Arendt defines power as the opposite of violence, stating that
“where the one rules absolutely, the other is absent.”84 True power resides,
moreover “where words are not empty and deeds are not brutal, where words are
not used to veil intentions but to disclose realities, and deeds are not used to
violate and destroy but to establish relations and create new realities.”85
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This definition is the cornerstone of women’s ways to just peace: acting
cooperatively to effect change within existing systems and create new systems,
witnessing and narrating their stories to reveal truth, and working to achieve
equality for all marginalized groups by creating just and sustainable forms of
economic development.
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Conclusion

Just war theory is a reactive doctrine consisting of a set of guidelines that
are meant to prevent unjust wars on a case by case basis. Unfortunately, as
can be seen by its long history, it has had to undergo periodic adjustments to
address evolving cultural and social systems and methods of war not previously
imagined. The theory is now facing its deepest challenges, with a militarized
world system that is armed to the teeth with ever more sophisticated and lethal
weapons. Moreover, as can be seen with Walzer’s justification of means that
would be unjust in normal circumstances, political and military actors have
moved away from the principles justifying entry into war to those that govern the
process of war. The world is rapidly evolving from a system of states as primary
actors to one that includes an interrelated assortment of local, regional, and nongovernmental participants. At the same time that modern wars are fought with
increasing savagery and destructiveness, just war theorists have primarily moved
from philosophical to procedural rules about going to war, emphasizing
international law, which is known to “confirm much more power than it denies.”86
Just peace, on the other hand, works within any human system because it has
always regarded conflict from a holistic perspective, as something that exists in
all levels and arenas of human existence. Feminists reject the dichotomized
rhetoric inherent in current discussions of war that refuses to acknowledge the
interrelationship between domestic, national and international violence. Just war
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theory perpetuates dichotomized views of war because it does not define war as
something that exists within the system that perpetuates the culture of violence.
Rather, it looks at each war as a specific event, analyzing each on a case by
case basis. This is a reactive theory that cannot deal with the underlying
problems inherent in the surrounding system that are the causes of conflict.
This paper has shown that just peace is an active theory that promotes
practices leading to the reduction of violence in all arenas and at all levels, from
fights in the schoolyard to ethnic conflicts and beyond. It affirms the
interrelationship between violence and the militarism prevalent in current society
and provides principles that can be used by people who are in traditional roles of
authority as well as those in non-traditional grassroots, community or
organizational levels and in all situations where violence exists. Just war theory
can certainly continue to play a role but should be one tool within the larger
framework of just peace theory.

50

References

Adenay, Bernard T. Just War, Political Realism, and Faith. Metuchen, N.J. & London:
The American Theological Library Association, 1988.
Allen, Beverly.. Rape Warfare: The Hidden Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Croatia. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1996.
Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologica First Part of the Second Part, Q. 90, trans.
Fathers of the English Dominican Province, (Benziger Bros. Edition, 1947). 15
June 2002. <
http://www.ccel.org/a/aquinas/summa/FS/FS090.html#FSQ90OUTP1 >
Arendt, Hannah. The Human Condition. Chicago & London: University of Chicago,
1958.
Arendt, Hannah. On Violence. San Diego, New York & London: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, 1969.
Aristotle. The Politics and The Constitution of Athens. trans. Jonathan Barnes, ed.
Stephen Everson Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Berkham, Joyce.. “Feminism, War and Peace Politics: The Case of World War I.” Eds.
Elshtain, J.B. and S. Tobias.. Women, Militarism & War: Essays in History,
Politics, and Social Theory. Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.,
1990.
Cicero, Marcus Tullius. De Officiis, trans. Walter Miller. Loeb Edition. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1913, Book I.34. The Stoic Legacy to the
Renaissance. 5 January 2002. < http://www.stoics.com/ >
Chernus, Ira. 2002. General Eisenhower: Ideology and Discourse. East Lansing:
Michigan State University Press.
Cohn, Carol & Sara Ruddick. “A Feminist Ethical Perspective on Weapons of Mass
Destruction.” to be published in Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction, Eds.
Steven Lee and Sohail Hashmi, under review at Cambridge University Press. 14
February 2004. <
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/wappp/research/working/cohn_ruddick.pdf >
Cooper, Sandi E. “Peace as a Human Right: The Invasion of Women into the World of
High International Politics.” Journal of Women’s History 14.2 (2002): 9-25.
51

Cuomo, Chris. “War is Not Just An Event: Reflections on the Significance of Everyday
Violence.” Hypatia 11.4 (1996):
<http://gw.softlineweb.com.proxy.usf.edu/record.asp?msel_from=0&msel_to=9&p
review=&move=&returnPage=list.asp&articleID=114302&recNum=1
Dawson, Doyne. The Origins of Western Warfare. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press,
1996.
Eichenberg, R.C. “Gender Differences in Public Attitudes toward the Use of Force by
the United States, 1990-2003”. International Security 28.1 (2003):110-41.
Ehrenreich, Barbara. 2003. “The Roots of War.” The Progressive 67(4): 14.
Elshtain, Jean Bethke. Women and War. Chicago and London: The University of
Chicago Press, 1987.
Elshtain, Jean Bethke. Just War Theory. Washington Square, New York: New York
University Press. 1992.
Elshtain, Jean Bethke. “Just War and Humanitarian Intervention.” Ideas, 8.2 (2002): 4.
Elshtain, Jean Bethke. “Luther’s Lamb: When and How to Fight a Just War.” Common
Knowledge, 8.2 (2002): 304-309.
Goldstein, Joshua. 2001. How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. War and Gender. Ed. Joshua
Goldstein. 16 March 2003 <http://www.warandgender.com/ >
Hutchings, Kimberly. “Ethics, Feminism, and International Affairs.” Eds. Coicaud, JeanMarc and Daniel Warner. Ethics and International Affairs. New York: United
Nations University Press, 2001.
Kuhse, Helga. Caring: Nurses, Women and Ethics. Maldon, MA: Blackwell, 1997.
LaCroix, W.L. War and International Ethics: Tradition and Today. Lanham, New York &
London: University Press of America, 1988.
Luard, Evan. Basic Texts in International Relations. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992
.
Meilaender, Gilbert. 2000. Michael Walzer: Just and Unjust Wars (1977). First Things,
101 (2000):52-53. 9 March 2003. <
http://www.firstthings.com/ftissues/ft0003/articles/ walzer.html>
52

Mosely, Alex. “Just War Theory”, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2001 15
June 2002. < http://www.utm.edu/ research/iep/j/justwar.htm >
Nomura, Gail M. “Peace Empowers.” Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies 22.3
(2001): 75-92
Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol 1. Avalon Project. Yale Law School. 9 March 2003. <
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb /avalon/imt/proc/discrep.htm >
Orend, Brian. War and International Justice: A Kantian Perspective. Waterloo & Ontario,
Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2000.
Peach, Lucinda. “An Alternative to Pacifism? Feminism and Just-War Theory,” 1994.
Bringing Peace Home.: Feminism, Violence and Nature. Eds. K.J. Warren and
D.L. Cady. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996.
Peters, Cynthia. “Women’s Patriotic Role,” ZNET. (2001). 23 March 2003. <
https://www.zmag.org >
Rabrenovic, Gordana and Laura Roskos. “Introduction: Civil Society, Feminism, and the
Gendered Politics of War and Peace.” National Women’s Studies Association
Journal 13.2 (2001):40-54.
Rengger, Nicholas. “On The Just War Tradition In The Twenty-First Century.”
International Affairs 78.2 (2002): 353-363.
Roosevelt, Grace. “A Brief History of the Quest for Peace: Pacifism and Just War
Theory in Europe from the 16th to the 20th Centuries.” Global Policy Forum. 23
June 2003. <http://www.globalpolicy.org/resource/unhist/jinx1.htm >
Roper, Lynne. 2001. “Feminism is NOT Pacifism: A Personal View of the Politics of
War.” Feminist Media Studies, 2(1): 150-51.
Stiehm, Judith. “Recent Efforts by Feminists to Advance Peace: Some Reports.” Signs
28.4 (2003): 1231-2.
Sylvester, Christine. “Feminist Theory and Gender Studies in International Relations”,
International Studies Notes, 16/17, (Fall 1991/Winter 1992) 3/1:32-38 Feminist
Theory and Gender Studies. International Studies Association. 23 June 2002.
<http://csf.colorado.edu/isa/ftgs/index.html >
Tong, Rosemarie, "Feminist Ethics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall
2002 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), 23 March 2003.
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ fall2002/entries/feminism-ethics/>
53

True, Jacqui. “Feminism.” Theories of International Relations, Eds. S. Burchill and A.
Linklater, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995, 1996.
Walker, R.B.J. "Gender and Critique in the Theory of International Relations" Ed. V.
Spike Peterson Gendered States: Feminist (Re)Visions of International
Relations Theory Boulder: Lyn ne Rienner, 1992. 179-202.
Ury, William L. The Third Side: Why We Fight and How We Can Stop. New York:
Penguin Books, 2000.
Ury, William. Must We Fight? From the Battlefield to the Schoolyard-A New Perspective
on Violent Conflict & Its Prevention. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2001.
Ury, William. “A Global Immune System.” Andover Bulletin Online Winter 2002: 95.2
Andover University. 22 February 2004 <
http://www.liu.edu/cwis/cwp/library/workshop/citmla.htm >
Walzer, Michael. Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations,
Second edition, New York: Basic Books, 1992.1 Walzer.,61–2.
Women Waging Peace. About Us. 22 February 2004. <
http://www.womenwagingpeace.net/ content/aboutus.asp >
Zinn, Howard. 2002. “The Others.” The Nation 19 March 2003.
<http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20020211&s=zinn >

54

Appendix A: Just Peacemaking: Ten Practices for Abolishing War
(Pilgrim Press: August, 1998)
Summary of the theory for the panel on Just Peacemaking Theory
at the annual meeting of the American Academy of Religion
Orlando, Florida, November, 1998

Part One: PEACEMAKING INITIATIVES
1. Support nonviolent direct action.
Nonviolent Direct Action is spreading widely, ending dictatorship in the
Philippines, ending rule by the Shah in Iran, bringing about nonviolent revolutions
in Poland, East Germany, and Central Europe, transforming injustice into
democratic change in human rights movements in Guatemala, Argentina, and
elsewhere in Latin America, in South Africa.... Governments and people have the
obligation to make room for and to support nonviolent direct action.
2. Take independent initiatives to reduce threat.
Independent initiatives: 1) are independent of the slow process of negotiation; 2)
decrease threat perception and distrust but do not leave the initiator weak; 3) are
verifiable actions; 4) and carried out at the announced time regardless of the
other side's bluster; 5) have their purpose clearly announced--to shift toward deescalation and to invite reciprocation; 6) come in a series; initiatives should
continue in order to keep inviting reciprocation. This new practice has been
crucial in several recent breakthroughs.
3. Use cooperative conflict resolution.
1) Active partnership in developing solutions, not merely passive cooperation. 2)
Adversaries listen to each other and experience each others' perspectives,
including culture, spirituality, story, history and emotion. 3) Seek longterm
solutions which help prevent future conflict. 4) Seek justice as a core component
for sustainable peace.
4. Acknowledge responsibility for conflict and injustice and seek repentance and
forgiveness.
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Abstract A (continued)
Until recently, it was widely agreed that nations would not express regret,
acknowledge responsibility, or give forgiveness. But Germany since World War
II, Japan and Korea, Clinton in Africa, the U.S. finally toward JapaneseAmericans during World War II, the South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, and other actions described by Shriver, An Ethic for Enemies and
Wink, When Powers Fall, show a crucial new practice is emerging that can heal
longstanding bitternesses.
Part Two: JUSTICE
5. Advance democracy, human rights, and religious liberty.
Extensive empirical evidence shows that the spreading of democracy and
respect for human rights, including religious liberty, is widening the zones of
peace. Democracies fought no wars against one another during the entire
twentieth century. They had fewer civil wars. And they generally devoted lower
shares of their national products to military expenditures, which decreases
threats to other countries.
Ties of economic interdependence by trade and investment also decrease the
incidence of war. Engagement in international organizations like the UN and
regional institutions is a clear predictive factor that they will be much less likely to
engage in war.
6. Foster just and sustainable economic development.
Sustainable development occurs where the needs of today are met without
threatening the needs of tomorrow--where those who lack adequate material
and economic resources gain access, and those who have learn to control
resource use and prevent future exhaustion.
A key to economic development in East Asian countries, especially Korea and
Taiwan, has been land reform that made wealth more equitable and thus created
a sizable local market for developing firms. By contrast, Latin America lacks real
land reform and equality, and therefore local consumers cannot afford to buy
products produced by local industries.
Part Three: LOVE AND COMMUNITY
7. Work with emerging cooperative forces in the international system.
Four trends have so altered the conditions and practices of international
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Abstract A (continued)
relations as to make it possible now, where it was not possible before, to form
and sustain voluntary associations for peace and other valuable common
purposes that are in fact working: the decline in the utility of war; the priority of
trade and the economy over war; the strength of international exchanges,
communications, transactions, and networks; and the gradual ascendancy of
liberal representative democracy and a mixture of welfare-state and laissez-faire
market economy. We should act so as to strengthen these trends and the
international associations that they make possible.
8. Strengthen the United Nations and international efforts for cooperation and
human rights.
Acting alone, states cannot solve problems of trade, debt, interest rates; of
pollution, ozone depletion, acid rain, depletion of fish stocks, global warming; of
migrations and refugees seeking asylum; of military security when weapons
rapidly penetrate borders.
Therefore, collective action is increasingly necessary. U.S. citizens should press
their government to pay its UN dues and to act in ways that strengthen the
effectiveness of the United Nations, of regional organizations, and of multilateral
peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace building. They resolve conflicts,
monitor, nurture, and even enforce truces. They meet human needs for food,
hygiene, medicine, education, and economic interaction. Most wars now happen
within states, not between states; therefore, collective action needs to include
UN-approved humanitarian intervention in cases like the former Yugoslavia,
Haiti, Somalia, and Rwanda "when a state's condition or behavior results in...
grave and massive violations of human rights."
9. Reduce offensive weapons and weapons trade.
A key factor in the decrease of war between nations is that weapons have
become so destructive that war is not worth the price. Reducing offensive
weapons and shifting toward defensive force structures strengthens that
equation. Banning chemical and biological weapons, and reducing strategic
(long-range) nuclear warheads from 3,500 to 1,000 each, are key steps.
Arms imports by developing nations in 1995 dropped to one-quarter of their peak
in 1988. But the power of money invested by arms manufacturers in politicians'
campaigns is a major obstacle to reductions.
10. Encourage grassroots peacemaking groups and voluntary associations.
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Abstract A (continued)
The existence of a growing worldwide people's movement constitutes one more
historical force that makes just peacemaking theory possible. They learn
peacemaking practices and press governments to employ these practices;
governments should protect such associations in law, and give them accurate
information.
Each practice is recent in its widespread use, and is causing significant change.
Together they exert strong influence, decreasing wars. Each is empirically
happening and being effective in abolishing some wars. Each faces significant
obstacles and blocking forces that are named in the chapters. We contend that
just peacemaking practices are ethically obligatory for persons, groups, and
governments to strengthen them and help overcome the blocking forces.
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